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THE TREATY POWER AND NATIONAL
FOREIGN POLICY AS VEHICLES FOR
THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Covey T. Oliver*

The physical mistreatment and social cruelties that humans inflict upon their disadvantaged fellow beings are so horrible1 that
social, political, and legal action against brutalitarians takes on an

emotional intensity that all humane persons must respect and
share. It is thus difficult to assume a neutral position in evaluating

particular courses aimed at the establishment of a normative world
order capable of advancing the causes of human dignity and freedom. The analyst who sympathizes with a determined human
rights movement but perceives that at times particular claims or
activities in furtherance of human rights may be damaging to other

social, political, and legal values cannot but feel guilty for having
had the perception.
One may thus suppress the perception or become disinclined
to weigh objectively the causal linkage between the achievement of

a human rights goal and one or more of the lines of action or argument developed to achieve it. That is, the benefit to the cause of
* Tsanoff Professor of Public Affairs, Jones Graduate School of Administration,
Rice University; Hubbell Professor of International Law (emeritus), The Law School,
University of Pennsylvania; sometime Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, U.S.A.
1. It is a sad and troubling circumstance that federal court transcripts and an
appellate opinion have had to record, in the interests of justice to the cause presented, the shocking and revoltingly inhumane treatment of citizens of the United
States by Mexican police, judicial personnel, and prison authorities in very recent
times. Rosando v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), sets out the abhorrent details of the arrest (by persons who did not identify themselves as officers), post-arrest
torture, drum-head court trial (with the judicial officer implicitly proposing bribes to
himself), mistreatment by prison gangs tolerated by the prison authorities, and denial
of the most elemental decencies as to conditions of imprisonment suffered by a
group of Americans, id. at 1184-86, who eventually found themselves serving the remainders of their Mexican sentences in prisons in the United States, under the terms
of a United States-Mexican treaty permitting such transfers reciprocally. Id. at
1198-1201.
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human freedom of a particular line of action may not be accurately
weighed as to its true contribution to that cause. Moreover, the
social costs to other positive objectives, including humanitarian
ones such as development, 2 may be understated or ignored. If such
tendencies, engendered as they are by a sense of guilt, are not corrected, the human rights movement itself seems an eventual loser,
for it will be deprived of the explicit identification of lines of action
that are of demonstrated effectiveness and political feasibility. As
the title of this Article indicates, I shall attempt to put aside the
ubiquitous temptation to demonstrate loyalty to the human rights
movement (by ignoring or understating problems of social costbenefit) and deal with two legal routes by which the achievement
of greater human rights for persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States has been sought: that is, through treaties other
than human rights conventions and through foreign-policy stances.
Ultimately, I hope to show that a misapprehension as to the proper
role played by these routes in international affairs has contributed
to a noble though misguided attempt to obtain their application in
domestic courts.
BACKGROUND

Historically, the treaty and foreign-affairs-powers theories of
action have been put forward in situations where a basis for protection under our Constitution had not yet been clearly established. It
happened that the United Nations Charter, with its recognition of
human rights and non-discrimination as, at the least, goals for
achievement, 3 came into force for the United States before the Su2. The question whether denial of development-assistance funds is justifiable
in the effort to induce human rights compliance by military juntas that impose themselves upon a people admits of only one answer so far as I am concerned: it is not.
First, denials policies do not work to induce change in the juntistas' political attitudes. To the contrary, it is a mistaken application of economic warfare strategies
used against highly industrialized, sea-lane vulnerable, enemy states, such as
Germany in two world wars and Japan in the second. Second, if developmentassistance inputs are not steady, the element of exponentiality on the development
curve is defeated. See generally Oliver, The Gringo's Light Switch and Human, Political, and Security Relationshipsin the New World South and East of the United
States, 17 WILLAMETTE L. Rv. 185 (1980). Third, the people who would benefit
from development are neither the culprits nor causally responsible for what juntas
do. Fourth, in the Congress of the United States, not all who demand that foreign aid
be cut off or reduced on human rights grounds are as much for human rights as they
are covertly against foreign assistance.
3. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter state:
Article 55-With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
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preme Court had developed constitutional principles, as explicit as
those known today, for the protection of human dignity. It was
thus in Shelley v. Kraemer,4 which involved racially restrictive land

covenants, that the United States as plaintiff invoked the provisions
of articles 555 and 566 of the United Nations Charter as an alter-

native ground for invalidation. The United States Supreme Court,
however, saw fit in the 1948 decision to abandon the theretofore

limited utilization of domestic civil rights vehicles and decided
the case on constitutional grounds favorable to a non-discrimina7
tion principle without considering the alternative argument.
A similar situation arose in the Sei Fujii case, 8 two years after
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56-All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55.

U.N.

CHARTER

4.

arts. 55 & 56.

334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, by special leave of the Court, the Solicitor

General argued for invalidation of the racially restrictive land covenants involved, in
representation of the United States as amicus curiae. With the Solicitor General
(Phillip B. Perlman) on the brief was the Attorney General (Tom C. Clark). The
Court decided for the plaintiffs seeking invalidation entirely on the equal protection
ground. Id. at 20. In his opinion, Chief Justice Vinson stated that the Court did not
find it necessary to deal with the due process and privileges and immunities of citizens (U.S.) clauses of the post-Civil War amendments, id. at 23, but no mention
whatever was made of the alternative treaty (United Nations Charter) theory of action, even though asserted by the government's brief and in several of the other
briefs amici, including that of the American Association for the United Nations. For
details, see Brief for the United States at 97; Brief for the American Association for
the United Nations at 13-14; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 27-28.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. Id.
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 20.
8. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950), aff'd, 38 Cal. 2d 718,
242 P.2d 617 (1952). At the time Sei Fujii was in the courts of California, the Federal
Supreme Court, in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), had sounded only an
uncertain trumpet as to the Alien Land Law and the Federal Constitution. The
intermediate appellate court in Sei Fujii did not venture beyond where the Supreme
Court had gone, on a fourteenth amendment theory of action, in Oyama, but invalidated the law under the treaty power (pursuant to articles 55 and 56 of the United
Nations Charter). 217 P.2d at 486-88; see note 3 supra.
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Shelley, in 1950. The Alien Land Law of California, 9 not seen at

the time of the litigation as clearly invalid under the Federal Constitution, was successfully attacked on article 55 and 56 grounds in
a California appellate court. 10 That state's supreme court, however,
specifically rejected the intermediate court's reasoning, though it
affirmed the invalidation on constitutional grounds."
Accordingly, an entirely domestic route for the protection of

human rights-particularly the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment-provided solace to advocates of human dignity

12
and freedom. The great antidiscrimination decisions from 1954 on

gave continued assurance that many basic human freedoms would

be protected in the United States under the Constitution.
The judicial recognition of domestic vehicles for the protection
of human rights was timely, for history teaches that the effort to
eliminate racially based discrimination by use of the treaty power

induced something of a backlash in the halls of Congress. This
irony manifested itself in support of the Bricker amendment,1 3
9. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 261 (Deering 1944) (declared unconstitutional in
Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952)).

10. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d at 486-88.
11. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d at 738, 242 P.2d at 630. The California Supreme Court took the step the United States Supreme Court had not taken in
Oyama, 332 U.S. at 640-47, and invalidated the Alien Land Law under the fourteenth amendment, rejecting the alternative treaty-supremacy theory of action on the
ground that articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter are not self-executing.
38 Cal. 2d at 720-28, 242 P.2d at 619-24. The State of California did not take the decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. Even so, the decision of the
highest court of the state was immediately recognized-and has since been treated in
most quarters-as a landmark decision, both on the antidiscrimination reach of the
fourteenth amendment and the denial of internal effects as law to non-self-executing
treaties not implemented by legislation. See generally R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 96-97 (1979).
12. The watershed case was, of course, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); its progeny include, in chronological order, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); and Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
13. The Bricker proposal for amending the Constitution was originally introduced as S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG. REc. 921 (1952), but failed to
be reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Bricker, Safeguarding the Treaty
Power, 13 FED. B.J. 77, 77 n.1 (1953). The proposed amendment was introduced
anew as SJ. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 160 (1953); its substantive
sections provided:
1. A provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
2. No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of
the United States within the United States enumerated in this Constitution
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which was designed to reduce the maximum internal effect of treaor any other matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States.
3. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States
only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.
4. All executive or other agreements between the President and any international organization, foreign power, or official thereof shall be made only
in the manner and to the extent to be prescribed by law. Such agreements
shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by this article.
Id. at 161.
It is not necessary in this presentation to explain in any detail how an intricate
sequence of assertions and resistances thereto over a period (roughly 1948 to 1953)
produced a series of proposed amendments to the Constitution, several times voted
upon in the Senate. The late Senator John Bricker of Ohio was only one of a number
of Senate leaders involved in supporting such amendments. The Section on World
Peace Through Law of the American Bar Association was intensely active in parallel
support. Among the iriternationalists, one group continued to support an ideal of
"United Nations law as the law of the land," oblivious to the threat to an effective
international system that the Bricker lines of action portended. Another group resisted the Bricker drive politically and was sensitive to the risks of extremist efforts
to limit the scope of the treaty power. The heart of the "Bricker Bicker," as I have
called it elsewhere, was a proposal to amend article VI, clause 2 (the supremacy
clause) to eliminate the careful differentiation of the founders between "treaties
made... under the Authority of the United States" and federal legislation made "in
Pursuance" of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. The Brickerites would
have reduced the former to the reach of the latter. However, the Brickerites also fastened upon executive agreements, grounding themselves on dubious assertions in a
1942 study which claimed that the executive branch used executive agreements for
important matters and used treaties approved by the Senate only for technical and
less significant aspects of foreign-relations operations. This latter aspect of the
Bricker fight eventuated in the requirement that executive agreements be reported,
1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. II 1978). In as much as the incoming secretary of state for the
Eisenhower administration had, before taking office, supported curbing the treaty
power a la Bricker amendment, the executive branch did not mount immediate opposition to so drastic an impediment to foreign-affairs operations. But when Herman
Phleger became legal adviser to the Department of State, the situation changed.
Perhaps only now is the role played by Dwight D. Eisenhower, who behind the scenes helped to put down the Bricker-amendment drive, becoming known.
The intricacies of the drive for the amendment are covered in D. Tanenbaum, The
Bricker Amendment Controversy: The Interaction between Domestic and Foreign
Affairs (1980) (dissertation on file in Columbia University library). Even though the
Bricker-amendment drive failed as to changing the Constitution, it has had a longlasting effect as to inducing discretion and care within the executive branch when
changing or making internal law by the treaty route is under consideration. Thus, for
years, until the Panama Canal treaties came before the Senate during the Carter period, the general practice was that the executive branch would not send a treaty
requiring internal implementation by statute to the Senate for advice and consent
until enactment of the implementing legislation seemed assured. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAv OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 141-145
(1962); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 139-71 (1972). Senator
Bricker set forth his arguments in his 1953 article, supra. A debate concerning the
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ties to the limits of congressional power 1 4 in the absence of a

treaty. (That is, to the powers stated in or derived from article I,
section 8 of the Constitution.) The writer well remembers' 5 the
effect produced in a Senate committee when the late Senator
Everett McKinley Dirksen, speaking in support of the Bricker pro-

posal, waved about an amicus brief signed by Alger Hiss and alluded to the brief's argument that the treaty power authorized internal civil rights law that the Constitution by its own force did not
require.
Many of the supporters 16 of the Bricker amendment were iso-

lationists, but it is too facile to conclude that the effort to reduce
the federal treaty power to the maxima of the congresssional legis-

lative power was merely the result of isolationisml Time and again
the proponents of Brickerism answered objections related to the

role of the United States as a nation among nations by pointing out
that their proposals did not change at all the international capacity

of the United States to make treaties but only limited the internal
legal effects of such treaties. 17 Opposition to the enforcement of

civil rights by treaty in days that were still the days of Jim Crow
was a fundamental objective of the Brickerites.18 Their scare tactics
amendment, undertaken at the height of the controversy, was published in The
Bricker Amendment, MICH. ST.B.J., July, 1955, at 20-37.

14. Of course, as has often been noted, expansion of the legislative powers of
the Congress made the difference between the key phrasings of the supremacy
clause, quoted at note 13 supra, of far less importance than the Brickerites assumed,
wrongly even in their time. The Bricker group, apparently, was behind the times as
to what was happening constitutionally in the United States, as the foregoing and
their lack of foresight as to the steady march of antidiscrimination decisions under
the Constitution, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), both show.
15. As an ex-officer of the Department of State, by the time back in academe as
a teacher of international law, I joined in the resistance against the Brickerites.
Dirksen, before he mellowed into "Ev" of the "Ev and Charley Show," was a formidable and cunning foe. On the occasion recalled, Dirksen held in his hand the brief
of the American Association for the United Nations, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), and wanted the record to show that the first signer of that brief "was one
Alger Hiss."
16. A number of the senators supporting the drive to limit the treaty power
were from the isolationist wing of the Republican Party. (For a complete listing of
the 63 co-sponsors of the 1953 Bricker proposal, see 99 CONG. REc. 160, 161 (1953)).
It was the more-internationalist wing of the Republican Party that recruited thenGeneral Eisenhower to seek the Presidency. Their efforts were successful, at least to
the extent that President Eisenhower sought the defeat of the Bricker amendment.
See The Bricker Amendment, supra note 13, at 27.
17. The Bricker Amendment, supra note 13, at 28.
18. See generally MacChesney, The Treaty Power and the Constitution: The
Case Against the Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 203, 204 (1954).
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as to the scope of the treaty power induced prudent moderation as
to claims for its competence in courts, for a certain ambiguity as to
its internal effect was a more palatable alternative than destruction
of the power through crippling legislation. This tradeoff was implicitly recognized by Manley 0. Hudson, in a telegram 1 9 to counsel
for the state in Sei Fujii, while the case was on appeal to the
California Supreme Court:
I am astonished by the decision in the District Court of Appeal
in Fujii vs. California. In holding that the California Alien Land
Law must yield to the Charter of the United Nations as the superior authority, the court failed to take account of the established law of the United States that only the self-executing provisions of a treaty are automatically incorporated into the supreme
lav of the land of the United States so as to supersede previous
national or state legislation. Articles 55 and 56 and other provisions of the Charter cited by the court are in no sense selfexecuting.20
Professors Lillich and Newman have written that "Judge
Hudson's motives for minimizing the legal impact of the Charter
. ..in so dramatic a style are unclear." 2' 1 Ah, but hear the echo of
George Santayana's dictum about those who ignore the lessons of
history! Aside from always being dramatic, Judge Hudson undoubtedly feared a strong counterreaction against the existing treaty
power through the Bricker proposal should the higher court hold
that a treaty could invalidate a state act that the Federal Constitution did not. And with good reason, considering that John Foster
Dulles, a leader of the American bar soon to become secretary of
22
state, had sided with the Brickerites!
In addition to the upsurge in reliance upon the Constitution as
a means of enforcing human rights internally, and the fear that an
uncompromising effort to see treaties as self-executing would backfire, there is another (and structurally more significant) factor that
has mitigated against resort to the treaty power as a means of cur19. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 96-97. The authors presented
it as "An Unusual Occurrence in the Course of the Fujii Appeal," which, in as much
as it involved merely a telegram to the state's attorney, seems hardly extraordinary!
20. Id.
21. Id. at 96. The reason for the authors' surprise is unclear to me, since at
pages 84-87, immediately preceding, they have inserted an excerpt from Hudson's
writing that unequivocally supports the position he later took in the, telegram.
22. See Bricker, supra note 13, at 80. But see The Bricker Amendment, supra
note 13, at 37.
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tailing human rights violations. Internal law through self-executing
treaties in the United States is enacted by the President only with
the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, 23 a quirk of the American
Constitution not generally found in other leading democracies. 24
Thus, even assuming the lack of an entirely domestic vehicle, the
25
effort to provide an international route is at best difficult.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL

ROuTEs

AND INTERNAL LAW:

ADMIRABLE PERSISTENCE OR HARMFUL HINDRANCE?

So much as to why efforts to use the treaty power as an
alternative to the Constitution declined. Why, though, have some
human rights scholar-activists persisted with assertions that articles
55 and 56 of the Charter and comparable generalities in other organic conventions are internal law? Perhaps because of despair that
acceptable specific conventions on human rights will ever surmount
the bias against treaties written into the Constitution by the founding fathers, when by one vote they adhered to a required two23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24. It is rare among the constitutional systems of leading states that treaties become internal law outside the normal legislative process. Even in the United States
it is rare that self-executing treaties are found to exist where an internal legal effect
would be produced thereby. But cf. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924)
(holding the foreign-trader-rights provision in a treaty of friendship, commerce, and
navigation to operate "without the aid of any legislation, state or national." Id. at
341). On the other hand, when delegating power to the President to enter executive
agreements in the foreign-trade field, Congress kept the power to disapprove the results of his negotiations and has, .in the case of Tokyo Round under the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, put the international agreement into effect by legislation. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(amending 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.) (approving and implementing the agreements reached
at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations). On the general problem of
the United States being out of step with the rest of the world as to parliamentary participation in the treaty process, see Oliver, The Enforcement of Treaties by a Federal
State, 1-1974 RECUEIL DES COURS 331, 362-89.
25. The quirk has become outmoded politically since the enactment of the seventeenth amendment, providing for the popular election of senators. See Oliver, Editorial, Getting the Senators to Accept the Reference of Treaties to Both Houses for
Approval by Simple Majorities: Does the Senate's Sense Resolution in the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act Point a Way?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1980). The twothirds requirement amounts to a bias against international commitment by treaty that
is unique to the United States among leading nations. Theoretically the principle obtains also in countries that have copied the United States Constitution in absolute or
nearly absolute detail, but actually some of these states disregard their constitutions
or indulge in charades as to application. The question whether the Constitution of
1787 has been a desirable system for export is a valid one, considering the possibilities of linkage between this system and the syndrome of executive (often coupist)
domination and legislative impotence in certain Latin American countries.
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thirds approval in the Senate.2 6 Could it be, also, that even with
specific enumerations of rights in human rights conventions, they
wish to see a residual, constitution-like general authority of expansible content for control of anti-rights conduct in the United
States? Or could it be that they quest for a great ideal not yet assured in world terms through its complete acceptance as a
supranational mandate by the United States? Several of these possible motivations are suggested by this statement-question asked of
students by Lillich and Newman:
The Universal Declaration has been used by the courts of
many countries to flesh out and occasionally upgrade domestic
constitutional and statutory norms. If U.S. courts continue to regard the human rights clauses of the UN Charter as non-selfexecuting, and if the United States, when it ratifies the human
rights conventions does so with the non-self-executing reservations proposed by President Carter, should not human rights activists and civil rights lawyers argue that the Declaration infuses
U.S. constitutional principles with enlightened international
standards (e.g., that the Universal Declaration's Article 5 prohibition against "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" provides enlightened guidance as to the contemporary
content of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punish27
ment" standard)?
The authors are candid as to the case law against their belief
that the doctrine of Sei Fujii should be displaced.2 8 While they
point out that the Sei Fujii decision is binding on only California
courts, they also recognize the precedential value accorded that decision by other state courts.2 9 Nevertheless, in part relying on a
number of cases holding that certain Charter provisions are selfexecuting, 30 Lillich and Newman argue that the issue remains a
live one. Further, since the United States Supreme Court has
never addressed the question, they believe that reports of the
theory's death are premature. 3 '
The authors also point to a bit of hypocrisy on the part of the
United States. Why, for instance, has our government continually
condemned Chile, South Africa, and the Soviet Union for violating
26. See id. at 143 n.6.
27. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 122.
28. Id. at 100.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Charter obligations, while our courts have refused to recognize any
internal power of the very same provisions? 32 In addition, the authors correctly recognize that the International Court of Justice de-

clared the Charter's human rights provisions to be binding in regard to the internal affairs of Namibia, a conclusion the United

States supported on record in both the General Assembly and the

Security Council. 3 3 In conclusion, the authors offer an explanation
of our judiciary's reluctance and an argument for the casting aside

of that reluctance:
Some U.S. judges understandably find it difficult to accept
the fact that, on occasion, international human rights lav may
set a higher standard than U.S. constitutional or statutory law.
In an adversary proceeding, this reluctance mitigates against the
direct invocation of UN human rights norms. Nevertheless,
invoking international human rights law in domestic courts offers
an excellent opportunity to help expand constitutional guarantees
such as due process and equal protection. Why, even a Fujiiminded judge may reason, should such phrases in the U.S. Constitution be interpreted to guarantee fewer rights to the individual than does, say, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights?

34

Lillich and Newman offer an admirable dedication to an admirable ideal. The mere presentation of an argument for the invocation of non-self-executing law in domestic courts forces the
examination and reexamination of the purpose of the foreignaffairs-powers theory of action. Yet, their arguments contain an important misapprehension concerning the role properly played by
this theory of action, a role that was highlighted in a recent celebrated
case.
THE TREATY LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY THEORIES
REVIVED: ILLEGAL ALIEN SCHOOLCHILDREN'S SUITS
CHALLENGING A TEXAS STATUTE

In the late 1970's, various independent school districts in Texas
began enforcing a state statute35 that did not require the use of
state funds to educate persons who are not either citizens of the
United States or legally admitted aliens. This enforcement, un32.

Id.

33. Id.

34. Id. at 101.
35. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.03(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
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dertaken in reaction to the increasing burden placed on these school
districts by a growing number of illegal alien schoolchildren, 36 was
challenged in a number of suits beginning in 1977. 37 The plaintiff
children and their parents reacted to the difficulty of paying tuition
to attend local public schools, 38 while the schoolboards, dependent
upon state funds for a considerable portion of their budget, assumed
that the statute authorized-if not commanded-the exclusion of
39
plaintiffs from free tuition.
The first case was brought against the Independent School
District of Tyler, Texas, on equal protection 40 and overriding treaty
and foreign-policy theories of action.41 The theories in the
alternative to the constitutional ground were supported by a brief
amicus filed by a human rights group. 42 The district judge ruled
for the plaintiffs on both equal protection and overriding federal
law grounds 43 and the case was affirmed (on equal protection
grounds) on October 20, 1980, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.4 At the same time, a group of parallel
cases was consolidated for trial before a federal district court in
45
Houston.
The consolidated case was decided, after extensive hearings,
on July 21, 1980, by Judge Woodrow Seals. 46 While Judge Seals
36.
448 (5th
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575-76 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d
Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 574-78.
Id. at 578-79.
See id. at 592.
See Brief for Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund.

43. 458 F. Supp. at 589-90.
44. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex.
1980); see note 112 infra.
46. Id. It had been assumed that the court of appeals might dispose of all the
cases that had arisen in a single act of review, even though the earlier Plyler case
had been argued on appeal before the consolidated cases from Houston were tried.
However, this did not eventuate; so the disposition of the appeal fairly well indicates what the same court will do with the later, larger case. The district court decision in Plyler was affirmed for the alien school children entirely on equal protection
grounds. 628 F.2d 448, aff'g, 458 F. Supp. 569. -The court of appeals (i) disagreed, id.
at 451-52, with the district court as to whether there had been federal legislative
preemption under De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), (ii) found, 628 F.2d at 453,
there was none under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (Supp. III 1979), and (iii) disposed of the treaty leg
of federal supremacy as follows: "Likewise, the Protocol of Buenos Aires ... which
has never been considered self-executing, recognizes the desirability of providing
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ruled for plaintiffs, he rested his decision to issue an injunction
against the denial of free tuition exclusively on equal protection
grounds. 47 The judge considered the alternative grounds advanced
by the plaintiffs through acceptance by them of a brief amicus filed
by the International Human Rights Group of Washington, D.C.,4 8
49
but ultimately rejected those theories.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit stayed 50 the trial judge's injunction against denial of free tuition to undocumented alien schoolchildren; but Justice Powell vacated the stay, 51 with the result that
throughout Texas "named and unnamed non-citizen children," to
use the designation that appears in the heading of the order by Justice Powell, 52 were registered in August-September, 1980, without
paying tuition. In this posture, the consolidated cases 53 are now
pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Inasmuch as plaintiffs in the unconsolidated first case relied upon both
equal protection and treaty/foreign-policy grounds, 5 4 and the trial
judge in the later consolidated cases considered and rejected the
alternative grounds, 55 it is possible that the circuit court will address the issues that are of interest here,56 even though it decided
the unconsolidated case solely on equal protection grounds. This
conjecture is reinforced by the fact that a decision involving the
question whether a treaty (not one involving human rights) is
self-executing was recently decided against self-execution by the
education to all children, but does not indicate a clear commitment to educating children illegally in the country." 628 F.2d at 453-54 (footnotes omitted).
47. 501 F. Supp. at 583-84.
48. Brief for International Human Rights Group of Washington, D.C.
49. 501 F. Supp. at 584-96.
50. The timing of the various decisions presents interesting questions. On July
21, 1980, the district court issued its injunction in the consolidated cases, id. at 597,
and later refused to stay the injunction. However, the injunction was subsequently

stayed, though without opinion, sometime prior to September 4, by the Fifth Circuit.
On September 4, Mr. Justice Powell vacated the stay. Certain Named and Unnamed
Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents, 101 S.Ct. 12 (1980). Perhaps in response to
Justice Powell's action, and in seeming contradiction to their action in vacating the
stay in the consolidated cases, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the unconsolidated case,
Doe v. Plyler, on October 20, 628 F.2d 448, affg 458 F. Supp. 569.
51. Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents, 101
S. Ct. 12 (1980).
52. Id.
53. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
54. See 458 F. Supp. at 592.
55. 501 F. Supp. at 584-96.
56. But see notes 46 & 50 supra.
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Fifth Circuit. 57 United States v. Postal,58 the case under reference,

has been criticized by eminent scholarly authority on general
grounds. 59 The methodology used in that case to characterize the
treaty involved"0 as non-self-executing was explicitly based upon
the methodology of the Supreme Court of California in Sei Fujii.61

Before proceeding to Judge Seals' decision in the consolidated
cases, it would be prudent to examine the opinion of Mr. Justice
Powel162 as Circuit Justice on application to vacate the circuit

court's stay of Judge Seals' injunction. In so doing, one may find
some indication of the attitude on the general topic we are considering, that of the theories of action in the alternative that human
rights groups have advanced in these cases. Apropos of all appel-

late consideration still ahead, one assumes that it is well understood that causes based on alternative theories of action need not

be considered by judges beyond the first theory that decides the
case. However, courts may also rule for a party on all or more than
a single one of the theories of suit advanced. Finally, judges may

accept one, or less than all the theories of action advanced, but
take up the others to consider and reject them, as indeed Judge
Seals did in the consolidated cases. But it is especially to be noted
that a theory of action in the alternative is supposed to stand on its

own bottom; so theoretically, at least, the plaintiffs in the
schoolchildren's cases are asking courts to rule for them on treaty/
foreign-relations grounds even if the courts do not agree with the

first (or constitutional) ground advanced. This is the case posed by

57. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
58. Id.
59. See Riesenfeld, Editorial, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and
United States v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980).
60. The treaty did not involve human rights per se, but whether article 6 of the
1958 Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, was self-executing. The court held that it was not, 589 F.2d at
878, and that, although the arrest by the Coast Guard of an identified foreign vessel, not hotly pursued, violated the international obligations of the United States under the convention, no jurisdictional defense to criminal prosecution for hovering (to
smuggle narcotics) lay. Id. at 884.
61. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). There was one variance from the usual interpretative methodologies used by the courts in the United States
to resolve the issue of self-execution, vel non. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154 (1962). The testimony of the chief
negotiator for the United States at the Senate hearing was accepted in evidence and,
"[a]lthough ... not entirely unequivocal," was given weight. 589 F.2d at 881.
62. 101 S. Ct. 12 (1980).
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Lillich and Newman, as noted above, 63 where they think judges
should not be deterred by the presence of a standard higher than
that of domestic laws.
Justice Powell's order vacating the statewide stay of the circuit
court mentions only the equal protection theory of action, even
when citing 64 the Tyler Independent School District Case, where
the alternative grounds of interest here were generally relied upon
by plaintiffs. That case, however, was not within the purview of
the Circuit Justice (Mr. Justice Powell) in this hearing, as it was in
Judge Seals' opinion in the consolidated case where the order was
for a statewide injunction. It was this injunction that was stayed by
the circuit court and taken to the Circuit Justice.
Justice Powell declared that when vacating a stay pending appeal the Circuit Justice should be satisfied that (i) there is a likelihood that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari or note probable
jurisdiction and (ii) a significant possibility that a majority of the
Supreme Court will agree with the district court's decision. 65
Recognizing that it is difficult to determine whether the second
eventuality will happen, Justice Powell noted that the major case
relied upon by the district court, Matthews v. Diaz,66 upheld the
power of Congress to make distinctions (as to Medicare benefits)
between legal and illegal aliens under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 67 Continuing, he noted that the extremely broad
power of Congress over all aspects of immigration and naturalization was involved in the Diaz case, 6 s whereas here the issue under
an equal protection analysis involves the relationships between aliens and states of the Union, a matter carefully reserved in the
earlier case.6 9 Nonetheless, he concluded: "Although the question
is close, it is not unreasonable to believe that five Members of the
Court may agree with the decision of the District Court

...

"70

In context, the phrase "agree with the decision of the District
63.
64.
65.
66.

See text accompanying note 34 supra.
101 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978)).
Id. at 14.
426 U.S. 67 (1976), holding that the due process clause applies to "aliens

unlawfully residing in the United States." (Justice Powell's language in the instant
case, 101 S. Ct. at 13, to state the rule of Diaz.)
67. 101 S. Ct. at 15.

68. Id.
69. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84-85. The issue was dealt with in the
negative as to generalized federal preemption by Judge Seals in the consolidated
case. 501 F. Supp. at 586.
70. 101 S. Ct. at 15.
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Court" refers only to the explicit holding upon which the injunction was based (equal protection), not to the totality of Judge Seals'
opinion. Under these circumstances a commentator may venture

that it is also not unreasonable to believe that at least some members of a majority of the Supreme Court that should agree with

Judge Seals would also express views on the alternative theories of
action that he took up and rejected. This may depend in large part
71
on the framing of the Fifth Circuit's opinion on appeal.

Thus, we come to an examination of what was argued before
Judge Seals regarding the alternative theories of action and his re-

sponses thereto. At this point full disclosure requires me to reveal
that I, steadfastly for the alien children on public policy and hu-

manitarian grounds under equal protection, testified as an expert
witness for the state on the alternative grounds, largely because I
regarded the contentions of the brief amicus as incorrect on

grounds of precedent, bad from the standpoint of foreign-policy operations, and to some degree lacking in the candor owed by counsel to a court. 72 Despite knowledge of my outlook on the constitutional merits of the case, the state accepted me as their expert
witness on the alternative theories of relief, I believe, because
counsel for the state found these latter contentions unnerving for
their novelty. 7a

The plaintiffs' basic contentions under the alternative theories
of action, outlined in the proposition presented at the opening of

the brief amicus, 74 revolved around two central theories. First,
See notes 46 & 50 supra.
72. Plaintiffs did not, for example, cite to Fujii in their brief. At trial, plaintiffs
in charge of the treaty/federal preemption leg of the argument sought to diminish the
Fujii decision by reference to the lack of a Supreme Court decision in that case. In
addition, an expert witness for the plaintiff testified on cross examination that he
deemed Fujii outmoded.
73. Counsel found the contentions to be novel, not in general, as Fujii had proceeded along similar general lines of argumentation, but as to effective response in
regard to the O.A.S. Charter.
74. The outline in the amicus brief read in pertinent part:
III. DENIAL OF FREE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL EDUCATION TO
PLAINTIFFS VIOLATES UNITED STATES TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND MUST THEREFORE BE PROHIBITED UNDER THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. Charter of the Organization of American States
B. Charter of the United Nations
C. The relevant human rights provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the United Nations Charter are self71.
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they argued that the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter7 5 and the Charter of the Organization of American
States76 were being violated by the Texas statute's 77 denial of
tuition-free education. As a crucial second step in their analysis,
plaintiffs put forth the proposal that the Charters' provisions are
self-executing. Accordingly, then, their first conclusion was that the
Texas statute operated against fulfillment of United States treaty
obligations and were thus prohibited by the supremacy clause. 78

executing and therefore directly binding on the state and local governments
IV. SECTION 21.031 IS PREEMPTED BY OR CONSTITUTES AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH THE EXERCISE OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER AND IS
THEREFORE INVALID UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. The Texas statute and school board policy are preempted by federal laws, treaties, and other activities concerning the treatment of
aliens and human rights, and they are thereby unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause
1. The Texas statute is preempted by federal activities with respect to
immigration and the protection of alien rights
2. The Texas statute is preempted by federal treaties in the area of human rights, education, and non-discrimination
3. The Texas statute is preempted by federal policy as expressed in
the Convention Regulating the Status of Aliens in their Respective
Territories
B. The Texas statute violates expressed and implied foreign policy
objectives of the federal government and thus constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the exclusive federal foreign affairs authority
75. See note 3 supra.
76. Article 31, section (h) of the O.A.S. Charter provides:
To accelerate their economic and social development, in accordance
with their own methods and procedures and within the framework of the
democratic principles and the institutions of the inter-American system, the
Member States agree to dedicate every effort to achieve the following basic
goals:
h) Rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities for all.
O.A.S. CHARTER art. 31, § (h). Other provisions of article 31 are discussed in text accompanying notes 93-99 infra.
77. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.03(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
78. See note 74 supra. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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The second theory was premised upon the federal government's exclusive authority in the area of foreign affairs. 7 9 By this
argument, the Texas statute was in contravention of federal activities in the areas of immigration and alien rights, federal treaties regarding education, human rights, and non-discrimination, and federal participation in the Convention Regulating the Status of Aliens
in their Respective Territories. While similar in appearance to the
first theory, the second does not rely upon the potential selfexecuting authority of these policies. Instead, the theory proposes
that because the federal government has chosen to exercise its exany contravening state
clusive foreign-affairs power in these areas, 80
clause.
supremacy
the
by
policy is prohibited
The treaty power argument as to the Charter of the Organization
of American States caught my eye, since I had been Assistant Secretary of State for the region at the time. of the 1967 Protocol of
Buenos Aires, 8 ' and as such I knew two highly relevant facts about
diplomacy and treatymaking in the Western hemisphere: (i) that
provisions of the sort relied upon by the brief are commonly understood to be good intentions and common goal utterances but
not explicit national commitments, and (ii) neither Mexico, from
whence the illegal aliens and their non-citizen progeny mainly
come, nor any other treaty party, most likely, would admit a reciprocal obligation to the one sought to be imposed here.
Judge Seals began his treatment of the O.A.S. Charter/treatypower argument by recognizing that the United States became an
O.A.S. member by ratifying the Charter on June 19, 1951.82 Significantly, he next quoted the preamble to article 31 83 (which in
section (h) deals with illiteracy and education) and to article 47,84
which deals exclusively with education. Because these preambles
provide a special insight into the workings of foreign policy, they
are worthy of being printed here in text. The preamble to article
31 provides: "To accelerate their economic and social development,
in accordance with their own methods and procedures and within
the framework of the democratic principles in the institutions of
79. See note 74 supra.

80. Id.
81. The O.A.S. Charter was amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, entered
into force Feb. 27, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, O.A.S.T.S.

No. 1-A, O.A.S.O.R.,

O.E.A./Ser.A/2, add. 2.
82. 501 F. Supp. at 589.
83. Id.
84. id.
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the inter-American system, the Member States agree to dedicate

85
every effort to achieve the following basic goals."
The preamble to article 47 provides: "The Member States will
exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their constitutional
processes, to insure the effective exercise of the right to education,

on the following bases ....

"86

Judge Seals next reviewed the well-settled conditions under
which a treaty becomes internal law, and concluded that it does so
only "if it is self-executing, or, if it is non self-executing, only when
it is implemented by act of Congress." 8 7 As no relevant act of Congress had been passed regarding articles 31 or 47, it was only left
to determine whether the O.A.S. Charter was a self-executing
treaty. The two principal methods of determination were stated as
follows:
First, the language of the treaty must manifest that the parties
intend to confer rights or obligations on the citizenry of the compacting nations. Second, 'if the instrument is uncertain, recourse
may be had to the circumstances surrounding its execution.
...1 "1Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-22, 242 P.2d 617,
620 (1952). 88

Relying in large part on the language in the relevant preambles
quoted above, the judge concluded that no contractual obligation
had been created and that the circumstances surrounding the ratification of the Charter indicated only that the parties had agreed to
certain goals worth seeking within the limits of their internal proc89
esses.
As to the plaintiffs' second alternative theory, the foreignpolicy-preemption argument, the court recognized that the Charter
evinces "a federal commitment to education which we have affirmed to the international community."90 However, quoting Justice Stewart, Judge Seals cautioned that the " 'shifting winds at the
State Department' cannot control whether a particular statute is in
conflict with the United States' conduct of foreign relations." 91 On
this basis, he argued that the intention of those who ratified the
85. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 31 (preamble) (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 47 (preamble) (emphasis added).
87. 501 F. Supp. at 589.
88. Id. at 590 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 589-92.
90. Id. at 591 (quoting Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart,
J., concurring)).
91. Id.
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treaty should control the question whether its goals were to be
92
protected by the supremacy clause.
Article 31 of the Charter is an enumeration of fourteen goals,
the achievement of which was to be sought with "every effort" of
the member states. 93 Among these are equitable distribution of national income; 94 adequate and equitable bases of taxation; 95 adequate housing for all sectors of the population;96 fair wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable working conditions for
all; 97 and rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities for all. 98 Were the foreign-policy-preemption
argument to be accepted in the schoolchildren's cases, all state law
in conflict with any of these wide-ranging goals would be subject to
invalidation pursuant to the supremacy clause. The judge concluded that even if it were questionable whether the language of
the Charter is contractual in nature, the intention of the ratifying
administration could not have been that article 31 should "be used
by the judicial branch as a test for all state and federal statutes
which touch on subjects embraced." 99
Judge Seals' treatment of the relevant provisions of the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 00
was similar to his discussion of the O.A.S. provisions. While
recognizing that "these are admirable principles [and] represent
standards toward which all societies should strive,"''1 1 he concluded
that "[h]olding those principles in high esteem does not mean that
the City of Houston could not constitutionally decline to provide
its workers with paid vacations [article 24, Declaration] or that the
State of Texas intrudes into foreign relations if it denies a person
02
the right to education."'
The court passed over in silence the failure of the brief to cite
Sei Fujii and to make clear that the American Convention on Human Rights has only (and belatedly) been signed by a President' 0 3
92. Id.
93.

O.A.S. CHARTER art. 31.

94. Id. art. 31, § (b).
95. Id. art. 31, § (c).
96. Id. art. 31, § (k).
97. Id. art. 31, § (g).
98. Id. art. 31, § (h).
99. 501 F. Supp. at 592.
100. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
101. Id. at 593.
102. Id.
103. Along with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, which has
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and is still pending in the Senate, 10 4 with reservations proposed by
the executive. 10 5 In any case, the existence of foreign-policy lines
of action by a particular administration were dismissed as to their
competence under the supremacy clause to displace state law.' 06
An eloquent statement by Judge Seals, placing in perspective the
role of the foreign-policy power, bears restatement here:
The constitutional delegation of the authority to conduct foreign
affairs enables our nation to speak with one voice in our dealings
with foreign governments and international organizations. That
authority, in the absence of the exercise of the power to make
treaties having the effect of domestic law, has not evolved to
prohibit the states from enacting laws which may affect an area
07
of international concern.'
CONCLUSION

Although not wishing to include oneself in the class, it is true
that professional diplomats in many quarters have found the American human rights movement in recent years to violate Talleyrand's
dictum, "and above all, not too much zeal." In the negotiation of
international agreements, especially structural ones, it is often necessary to balance one side's desire for commitment now to common
action against another side's reluctance to go beyond agreeing to
work in its own way toward general goals. In this area the second
best is not really the enemy of the best because the latter is simply not an attainable negotiating objective. But it is better than
nothing to be able to bring up in diplomacy the lagging conduct of
another party through reference to earlier generalizations. This
serves the important function of a foot in the door. Were it not for
such enumerations as those in article 47 of the O.A.S. Charter, it
would not be possible to discuss national attainments in particular
countries, as the wall of inviolable national privacy would not have
been reduced at all.
been there for many years. Hearings were held in November, 1979, Hearings on the
International Human Rights Treaties Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Human Rights],
on four human rights conventions one of which is the American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Doe. OEA/SER. K/XVI/11,
Doc. 65, Rev. 1, CORR. 2 (1970). This latter convention was opened for signature in
1969, signed by the President on June 1, 1977, and referred to the Senate for advice
and consent on February 23, 1978.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. 501 F. Supp. 591.
107. Id. at 595.
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To attempt after the fact of treaty negotiation to bootstrap such
provisions into specific international commitment that either is automatically internal law, or that requires conforming internal legislation, would be undesirable operational retroactivity as far as the
original negotiation is concerned. If the United States is going to
follow a policy of making treaties that by possibility could have internal effect as law into supreme national law, the treatymakers
for the United States should know this when they sit down to negotiate.
Moreover, the three possible explanations for the admirable
continued advocacy of those human rights activists such as Lillich
and Newman, in the face of the continued validity of the Sei Fujii
doctrine, fail to provide realistic goals for the treaty process. If
these advocates seek a residual authority for the expansion of human rights in the United States, their goal can be realized by effective usage of our own Constitution without the resultant harm to
the conduct of foreign policy. If they seek to avoid the difficulties
of treaty ratification, they risk havoc in a renewal of Bricker-like
proposals. And if they seek to set a precedent here for a great ideal
to be recognized and later enforced worldwide, they must misread
the reality that other nations are led primarily by their own internal dictates and that "second best" generalities are better than none
at all. Nonetheless, continued advocacy of domestic application of
the international routes provides for the continued examination of
the purpose of the foreign-affairs-powers theory of action.
Finally, to thrust the load into the treaty process that the human rights activists sought to impose in the alien children's cases,
places, especially in these times,1 0 8 too great a burden on that
process, already somewhat fragile as a result of our peculiar arrangements (under the Constitution) as to treaties.1 0 9 The prospect of ei108.

Even armed attacks by one member on another no longer invoke serious

action in the Security Council or reference to the General Assembly under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution. G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 10, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1950). Compare the Suez Crisis of 1956. When the restrictions on national use of force under articles two through four of the Charter are varied by
majoritarian and rogue state insistence that use of force for attainment of their

"good" or "vital security" preferences is as legal as individual and collective selfdefense. When the O.A.S. limps along, as ineffectual under the supposed structural
improvements of the Protocol of Buenos Aires as formerly. When internal political
shifts in the United States in response to frustration with much of the rest of the

world hint at the loss of current expectation as to the rise of an effective world legal
order and of return to realpolitik.
109.

There is always latent hostility to the capacity of the President and two-
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ther no Senate approval of the human rights conventions now before it,1 10 or their approval with all the reservations proposed by
the executive branch," 1 ' would be regrettable. But to assert, while
these are before the Senate, that the United States is already
committed under general provisions in basic charters, can have
only even worse effects on the prospect of Senate approval, on
their implementation by simple majority in both houses, on a useful diplomatic modality, and perhaps even on the cause of human
rights under the Constitution. Above all, it is certain that binding
ourselves up as a nation in this way is not going to further the
cause of human rights elsewhere, not even in Mexico. We would
end up looking silly to other countries; and that is no way to influence and lead, as by now we ought to have learned,
not only from
i1 2
well.
as
others
from
but
human rights episodes,
thirds of the Senate to control the conduct of foreign relations to the exclusion of the
House of Representatives. As the Panama treaties episode clearly shows, this hostility can become patent. There would be public dislike (were the public to be informed by arousal in some controversial situation) of the capacity of a Republican
President and two-thirds of a Republican-organized Senate to make internal law by
treaty to the exclusion of the Democratic House. In other quarters the Senate's all
too well known role as the graveyard of treaties chafes, especially as conservative
disinterest-if not hostility-to international human rights movements develops. It is
a time, in the great drive for world respect for human dignity, for battening down the
doctrinal hatches and eschewing quixotic argumentation.
110. See Hearings on Human Rights, supra note 103.
111. See id.
112. As this article went to press, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, without opinion,
Judge Seals' decision in the consolidated case.
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